The (Economic) Effects of Lay Participation in Courts - A Cross-Country Analysis by Stefan Voigt
 
Joint Discussion Paper 
Series in Economics 
by the Universities of 
Aachen · Gießen · Göttingen 










The (Economic) Effects of Lay Participation in Courts - 


















This paper can be downloaded from 
http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/index_html%28magks%29 
 
Coordination: Bernd Hayo • Philipps-University Marburg 
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics • Universitätsstraße 24, D-35032 Marburg 







Göttingen  MAGKS The (Economic) Effects of Lay Participation in Courts – 
A Cross-Country Analysis 
Stefan Voigt, MACIE (Philipps University Marburg), CESifo and ICER, Torino*
 
Abstract: 
Legal philosophers like Montesquieu, Hegel and Tocqueville have argued 
that lay participation in judicial decision-making would have benefits 
reaching far beyond the realm of the legal system narrowly understood. 
From an economic point of view, lay participation in judicial decision-
making can be interpreted as a renunciation of an additional division of 
labor, which is expected to cause foregone benefits in terms of the costs as 
well as the quality of judicial decision-making. In order to be justified, 
these foregone benefits need to be overcompensated by other – actually 
realized – benefits of at least the same magnitude. This paper discusses 
pros and cons of lay participation, presents a new database and tests 
some of the theoretically derived hypotheses empirically. The effects of lay 
participation on the judicial system, a number of governance variables but 
also on economic performance indicators are rather modest. A proxy 
representing historic experiences with any kind of lay participation is the 
single most robust variable. 
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The (Economic) Effects of Lay Participation in Courts – A Cross-Country 
Analysis 
Thus the jury, which is the most energetic means of making the 
people rule, is also the most efficacious means of teaching it 
how to rule well. 
De Tocqueville, Democracy in America 1835, 128 
1 Introduction 
In many countries, lawyers and judges are among the most highly specialized 
professionals if the duration of their entire education is accepted as crude 
indicator. Countries that use lay participation (LP) in their courts deliberately 
forgo reliance on these professionals. Economists stress the advantages of 
specialization and the division of labor. They should, hence, be critical concerning 
LP as the expertise of some specialists remains explicitly unexploited. Many legal 
philosophers, on the other hand, have been downright enthusiastic about LP in 
judicial decision-making. Yet, their claims have never been put to an empirical 
test. It is the contribution of this paper to put the competing claims of economists 
and legal philosophers to such a test. 
Both Hegel (1821) and Tocqueville (1835) dealt with the institution of the jury 
and praised it not for its advantages concerning the efficiency of adjudication but 
for its advantages for society in its entirety. At their time of writing, trial by jury 
existed primarily in England and its current and former colonies. France had just 
implemented some modified jury-model which spread from there to other 
countries on the continent as well as to other countries that were – directly or 
indirectly – influenced by the French, like some countries in Latin America. 
Today, we thus have a lot more empirical evidence concerning the functioning of 
juries within different economic, institutional, and cultural contexts. Hence, we 
can deal with their conjectures not only on theoretical but also on empirical 
grounds. 
But this paper also makes a contribution to the intense debate on the possible 
effects of various legal systems which was kicked off by La Porta et al. (1999) 
who claim that many current differences in various aspects of government 
performance like degree of corruption, quality of local infrastructure and many 
more could be explained by drawing on the legal origin of the respective country’s 
legal system. They distinguish between four such origins, namely British, 
Scandinavian, German and French. With regard to many aspects of government 
performance, they claim common law countries to come out first, whereas French 
legal origin is supposed to offer the worst prospects to a country. The authors thus 
do not analyze any specific differences with regard to the various legal systems.   3
Trial by jury is often seen as one crucial component of the common law legal 
origin, whereas the use of lay assessors (lay persons jointly deciding together with 
professional judges) is often associated with the other legal families. Dealing with 
the question whether LP is a root cause for the different effects of various legal 
systems is, hence, a contribution to the debate on legal origins. 
It is worth mentioning that LP has experienced a kind of renaissance in recent 
years: It has been re-introduced in countries as diverse as Japan, Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Spain. Our analysis will enable policy-makers to make more informed 
decisions on LP. 
Two channels through which LP could have economic effects are distinguished: 
the first channel works via the effects of LP on the quality of the judiciary. If it 
helps to improve its quality, this ought to be reflected in economic outcomes such 
as investment, income and growth. The second channel works via the effects of 
LP on the political system at large. Legal philosophers have, e.g., argued that 
participation of the population in judicial decision-making would improve the 
information about the functioning of the entire political system but also its 
identification with the political system. LP would, in other words, increase the 
legitimacy of political systems which could have a number of positive economic 
effects, e.g. the need to police the population would be reduced – and monitoring 
costs could be saved accordingly. 
A quantitative assessment of the various effects of trial by jury is surprisingly 
difficult as no cross-country data concerning the use of LP in judicial decision-
making is readily available. One part of the paper is thus devoted to presenting a 
new dataset generated for this study. Many of the arguments of the legal 
philosophers that will serve as one source for our theoretical inspiration have been 
made with regard to trial by jury. Another form of LP namely lay assessors, only 
developed during the 19
th century. Although there are important differences 
between these two forms of LP, both forms are put to an empirical test. We are 
thus able to establish differences between the two approaches empirically. 
Overall, the effects of LP on the judicial system, a number of governance 
variables but also on economic performance indicators are rather modest. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section presents a 
number of theoretical conjectures dealing with potential effects of LP both on the 
legal system narrowly delineated and beyond. Section three is an overview over 
quite a few aspects of LP. Section four describes the estimation approach as well 
as the data used. Section five discusses the results and section six concludes.   4
2 Hypotheses on the Effects of Lay Participation in the Judiciary 
This section serves to generate hypotheses on the possible effects of LP in judicial 
decision-making that are, at least in principle, empirically testable. In generating 
these hypotheses, we do not only rely on economic reasoning, but also heavily 
draw on a number of legal philosophers who have dealt with the topic for 
centuries. We propose to structure the hypotheses in a simple way: potential 
effects of LP on the legal system narrowly defined will be presented first. Only 
then do we turn to present a number of hypotheses dealing with potential effects 
of LP on the political system at large. The third, and final, step with regard to both 
channels is to conjecture about economic effects that could be caused via the two 
channels. 
Before, we shortly discuss the issue whether the study should be constrained to 
trial by jury – or can be extended to LP in general, i.e. include both jurors and lay 
assessors. Jury members decide without a professional judge having the right to 
vote, whereas lay assessors vote together with one (or more) professional judges. 
Neither jurors nor lay assessors are experts in the law. If one is interested in 
analyzing the effects of LP, it thus seems to make sense to include both jurors and 
lay assessors into the analysis. It has been observed (Thamann 2000, 335) that lay 
assessors almost never outvote the professional judge(s) whom they decide 
together with although in principle, this is possible in many institutional settings. 
It has also been noted (ibid.) that lay assessors are a lot less active in court than 
jurors in the sense of asking questions etc.1 Some legal scholars – often 
originating from the U.S. – argue that institutions providing for the participation 
of lay assessors in judicial decision-making are an attempt to keep direct citizen 
participation in the court system under the control of professional judges (e.g. 
Munday 1993). The experiences in many formerly socialist states seem to 
corroborate that conjecture. Yet, our empirical knowledge concerning the effects 
of lay assessor participation is very scarce. This is precisely the reason why both 
forms of LP are included here as this allows us to systematically compare the 
differential consequences of these two different forms of LP.2
                                                 
1   On the other hand, it has been observed (Kutnjak Ivkovic 1999, 18f.) that the absolute number of 
cases decided upon by lay assessors is presumably higher than that by juries. This is because civil 
law-countries do not have the institution of  plea-bargaining which drastically reduces the number 
of cases actually decided upon by courts in many common law-countries. 
2   Furthermore, trial by jury and lay assessor courts are not the only institutions of lay participation in 
the judiciary: justices of the peace and lay magistrates that are frequently drawn on to adjudicate 
minor offenses are two other institutions.   5
On the Effects of Lay Participation on the Quality of the Judiciary 
An argument that is often advanced in favor of trial by jury is that juries would be 
better in finding facts than a professional judge (see, e.g., Duff 2000, 279). The 
fact-finding capacity could be better because jurors come from many walks of life 
and are thus people who have a lot of first-hand experience in the real world.3 As 
a hypothesis (#1), one could formulate: 
In countries with lay participation in judicial decision-making, mistakes in 
judicial fact-finding will occur less frequently than in countries without lay 
participation. 
Given that this assumption is correct, an additional hypothesis drawing on 
Condorcet’s jury theorem can be developed that claims that the higher the number 
of jurors participating in a specific case, the lower the probability of mistakes in 
judicial decision-making. If this hypothesis was true, then this would certainly be 
one important aspect of the quality of judicial systems. Pouring some water into 
the wine, one could, however, argue that jurors have fewer incentives than 
professional judges to care about the outcome of a case, precisely because it is a 
one-shot game: they do not strive for a career within the judiciary and have, 
hence, no incentives to build up a reputation as informed, law-abiding, fair 
decision-makers. This might lead them to pay less attention than professional 
judges to the outcome of a case (for the theory of low cost decisions, see 
Kirchgässner and Pommerehne 1993).4
A high probability of judicial mistakes can have important economic effects: if 
citizens are not able to produce expectations on the likely interpretation of 
legislation that have a good chance of turning out to be correct, their propensity to 
enter into contracts in the first place will be lower. This would imply less division 
of labor and lower incomes. This argument applies primarily to private – as 
opposed to criminal – law. When testing it empirically, it is, hence, important to 
take into account whether LP is confined to criminal law or extends into the 
private law realm.  
                                                 
3   If this were the main cause for the better fact-finding capacity of juries, this should be especially 
relevant in legal orders in which the position of a professional judge is acquired as a usual step in a 
career – such as Japan or Germany – because career judges become judges at a rather young age 
and have thus had less chance to make their own first-hand experience with the trustworthiness of 
statements etc. 
4   But the opposite also appears plausible: precisely because being part of a court is no routine for 
jurors, they are more interested, pay more attention and so forth.   6
Prima facie, relying on amateurs (jurors) rather than on professionals (judges) in 
order to make very important decisions (in the past jury verdicts were often 
decisions concerning life or death) seems an odd idea. But the English 18
th 
century jurist Sir William Blackstone (1791, book 3, chapter 23) wrote of the jury 
as “the glory of English law” and claimed that it put “a strong … barrier between 
the liberties of the people and the prerogatives of the Crown.” This has remained 
one of the central arguments in favor of trial by jury until today: it is the jury that 
protects the individual from the prerogatives of the state. The jury makes sure that 
individuals do not depend on the whim of the powerful state but that it is their 
peers who decide whether they have committed some crime or have reneged upon 
a contract.5
Here are some arguments in favor of the assumption that lay judges are less 
dependent on government than professional judges: they do not have an interest in 
a judicial career, which means that they do not have to behave cautiously out of 
reasons unrelated to the current trial. But jurors should also be more independent 
because the other two branches of government will have a hard time putting 
pressure on them: the threat of firing them is not credible which is also true for 
many other of the often-used instruments vis-à-vis professional judges, such as 
reducing their salary and the like.67 This might be particularly relevant in cases 
that are of direct interest to government such as those involving the opposition, 
critical journalists etc. This is why many legal orders that rely on trial by jury 
have allocated such offences to juries. Formulated as hypothesis #2, it could read: 
                                                 
5   Blackstone’s argument is based on the assumption that in the absence of lay participation, judges 
are under the tutelage of the executive. But there might be other institutions safeguarding the 
independence of the judiciary such as a fine-grained separation of powers – or a high number of 
veto players. In order to prevent omitted variable bias, it is, hence, important to explicitly control 
for them. 
6   On the other hand, it could be argued that government has more incentives to exert influence on 
the selection of lay judges. This will, hence, have to be controlled for in the empirical part. The 
more radical option, namely that government might try to do away with lay participation altogether, 
might be real but will not be extensively dealt with here as we are not endogenizing the institutions 
of lay participation. 
7   Legal systems can be conceptualized like a value-chain: before courts act, a number of other actors 
have already acted, in criminal cases most likely the police as well as the prosecutors. It has been 
observed that in a number of countries (e.g. the former Soviet Union), judges almost always follow 
prosecutors. This tendency might also be curbed by the presence of lay judges and it played, indeed, 
a role in the discussion about the re-introduction of trial by jury in Japan (Kiss 2000, 356f.). This is, 
hence, another aspect of the conjecture that lay participation in judicial decision-making increases 
the independence of the judiciary.   7
Countries with lay participation in judicial decision-making enjoy factually more 
independent judiciaries than countries without lay participation, c.p.. 
A factually independent judiciary reduces uncertainty – and increases 
predictability – if it increases the likelihood that formal legislation gets factually 
implemented. If it functions like this, citizens will develop a longer time horizon 
which will lead to more investment in physical capital but also to a higher degree 
of specialization, i.e., to a different structure of human capital. All this means that 
JI is expected to be conducive to economic growth. Feld and Voigt (2003, 2006) 
present a measure of de facto JI and show that it is highly significant and robust 
for explaining differences in growth rates in a sample of more than 70 countries.8
A similar argument has been advanced by Adam Smith in his “Lectures on 
Jurisprudence” (1776/1982): “Another thing which curbs the power of the judge is 
that all causes must be try’d with regard to the fact by a jury. The matter of the 
fact is left entirely to their determination.” Smith seems more specific than 
Blackstone: for him, trial by jury is primarily a means to curb the power of the 
judge – and not the state at large. Yet, both have something similar in mind: the 
judge is often seen as a representative of the powerful state against which people 
who appear in court are ill-protected. Professional judges who are independent 
from the other branches of government as well as from the conflicting parties 
might misuse their factual independence by remaining uninformed, following 
their own ideologies, becoming lazy or even corrupt. It is assumed that one wants 
judges to be accountable to the law – and not, at least not directly, to the other 
branches of government, the conflicting parties or even the population at large.9 It 
can be argued that juries are a potential means to make professional judges more 
accountable: if juries force the judges to explain the central content of the law to 
                                                 
8   JI implies that judicial decision-makers can expect their decisions to be implemented regardless of 
whether they are in the (short-term) interest of other government branches upon whom 
implementation depends. It would further imply that judges and lay decision-makers – if there are 
any - do not have to anticipate negative consequences as the result of their decisions, such as (a) 
being expelled, (b) being paid less, or (c) being made less influential.  
9   A judiciary can be said to be accountable to the law if judicial decision-makers have incentives to 
apply the letter of the law – and not the wishes of other actors. Voigt 2008 deals with the 
relationship between judicial independence and judicial accountability and argues that they do not 
need to be conflicting but can, even, reinforce each other.   8
them in a comprehensible manner, the possibility that judges can shield 
themselves behind complicated language is reduced.10
Based on these arguments, one could derive hypothesis #3: 
Countries that use lay persons in judicial decision-making are expected to 
experience higher levels of judicial accountability than countries that do not, c.p.. 
Transparency is often said to be a precondition for accountability. The effect of 
LP on transparency is, however, somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, it can be 
argued to be higher with LP as a professional judge usually has to explain the 
relevant law to the jurors. Often, the decision is taken after the jurors have 
answered a list of very detailed questions. These measures can be said to increase 
the transparency of judicial decision-making vis-à-vis the population at large. On 
the other hand, the reasoning for the verdict is frequently not published which 
makes the decision-making process of juries rather intransparent. 
Accountability of judicial decision-makers to the law – and not to specific persons 
no matter whether they belong to the other branches of government or appear in 
court – implies that there is less room for “buying decisions”, i.e. for corruption 
within the judiciary. Regarding pressures put on by the accused party (or the 
contracting parties in case of a private law case), there has been some disquietude 
that jurors could be intimated by people involved in organized crime. This can, of 
course, not be excluded but the threat does not appear to be more serious than 
with regard to professional judges. The possibility of being bribed is another 
issue. It can be argued that the probability of lay judges being bribed should be 
lower than that of professional judges: (i) there is a lot more persons to be bribed, 
(ii) it is a one-shot game and establishing relationships thus extraordinarily costly, 
and (iii) the identity of the jurors is often known with very short notice only. 
These considerations can be summarized as hypothesis #4: 
                                                 
10   The U.S. is one of the few countries in which judges are subject to periodic elections. This induces 
a very special kind of accountability, namely to the constituency rather than to the law. It almost 
suggests itself to construct a connection between the necessity of re-election and the immense 
importance of trial by jury in the U.S.: trial by jury is a good means of making the professional 
judges also accountable to the law. Re-election necessities are not evenly distributed over the U.S. It 
would be fascinating to inquire whether the relevance of juries is negatively correlated with re-
election requirements.   9
In countries with lay participation in judicial decision-making, the judiciary 
should, c.p., be less corrupt than in countries without lay participation. 
A number of follow-up effects can be expected to occur: if the degree of 
corruption within the judiciary is low, then judges will be less tolerant regarding 
corruption in other government branches and the overall level of corruption ought 
to be lower. At the end of the day, low corruption levels decrease uncertainty and 
improve predictability so that one can expect economic effects like higher 
investment levels to occur. High degrees of corruption have, indeed, been shown 
to distort economic growth and development (Mauro 1995). 
Legislation and the judicial decision-making based on it need to reflect the 
coordination problems of those subject to legislation. It is at times argued that the 
common law is better in picking up changing needs than civil law because judges 
would be closer to the real problems than legislators. If this argument is correct, it 
might even be amplified if LP is part of the judicial system because lay judges 
might be closer still to the real problems than professional judges. Conjectures 
similar to this can, indeed, be found in the literature on LP. Munday (1993, 221), 
e.g., argued that jury trials allow “justice to be done in individual cases where the 
jury considers that it would be unduly harsh to adhere strictly to the letter of the 
law.” This is closely connected with another argument (ibid.) that stresses the 
higher degree of accountability of the state vis-à-vis its citizens: if laws appear to 
be inadequate or patently out-of-step with the views of ‘society’, the jury could 
interpret the law with flexibility thus making it compatible with the values and 
norms of society. 
Ascertaining whether judicial decision-making is in line with the problems real 
people have is no mean feat empirically. We thus propose the following 
hypothesis #5 that can be put to an empirical test: 
The quality of justice perceived by citizens is higher with lay participation than 
without, c.p.. 
This hypothesis only holds if we have good reasons to assume that (i) lay judges 
are more in tune with current coordination problems than both professional judges 
and legislators. In addition, the hypothesis is not unproblematic: legal certainty 
can suffer as a consequence of some lay judges being less harsh than the law 
permits. It can also be problematic because such decision-making would allow for 
the non-congruence between legislation and decision-making which could lead to 
a deterioration of predictability with a number of adverse economic effects spelled 
out above. In common law, there is a systematic place for judicial rule-making.   10
This is not the case in civil law which implies that this effect could be worse in 
civil law countries than in common law ones. 
But people who act contrary to established conventions might be less secure in the 
hands of jurors who might represent well-established conventions. Taking the 
argument one step further, one might even argue that trial by jury is an institution 
which could be a hindrance to innovation. It could furthermore be argued that trial 
by jury inheres the danger of transforming itself into an instrument for 
redistribution. A jury representing the median income earner might decide to put a 
hefty fine on someone simply because of his being more wealthy. Trial by jury 
could thus also lead to the exploitation of minorities by majorities. 
To sum up: the five hypotheses developed with regard to the effects of LP on the 
legal system thus all point in one direction: various aspects of the judiciary should 
be better with than without LP. At the end of the day, this ought to be reflected in 
economic variables such as income or growth. We now move on to the second 
battery of hypotheses that deal with the potential effects of LP on the political 
system at large. 
On the Effects of Lay Participation on the Political System at Large 
We began the section on the effects of LP on the judiciary by drawing on 
Blackstone and Smith. Of course, the arguments advanced by Blackstone carry 
over to the political system at large – and also remind us that the distinction used 
here is not entirely watertight.  
Among legal philosophers, Tocqueville (1835) is probably the one who is most 
explicit in stressing potential effects of LP on the political system. He makes a 
distinction between the jury as (1) a political institution and (2) a judicial 
institution and claims the former to be a lot more important than the latter: 
although it has an important impact on the outcome of cases (judicial institution), 
its impact on “the destinies of society at large” (political institution) is even more 
important. As a political institution, it would be an extremely important 
instrument to realize people’s sovereignty. The quality of the jury as a judicial 
institution is evaluated rather critically. It would go back to times with a lot less 
complexity than today.11
According to Tocqueville, the institution of trial by jury would teach people 
equity, it would teach people that they cannot escape from being responsible for 
                                                 
11   In other words, Tocqueville would not buy into many of the arguments just developed.   11
their own actions, it would teach everybody that they have duties vis-à-vis society, 
and it would subdue personal egoism, which he portrays as “the deap-seated evil 
of society.” 
The jury contributes powerfully to form the judgment and to increase 
the natural intelligence of a people; and this, in my opinion, is its 
greatest advantage. It may be regarded as a gratuitous public school, 
ever open, in which every juror learns his rights, enters into daily 
communication with the most learned and enlightened members of the 
upper classes, and becomes practically acquainted with the laws, 
which are brought within the reach of his capacity by the efforts of the 
bar, the advice of the judge, and even by the passions of the parties.12
Formulated as hypothesis #6, these arguments could read: 
In countries that use trial by jury, the population will be more knowledgeable 
concerning its legal order than in countries that do not use trial by jury. 
Greater knowledge of and familiarity with one’s own legal system can have 
economic consequences like relying on the legal system in a more informed and 
adequate way. 
Summing up his argument on trial by jury, Tocqueville writes that this institution 
would be the most effective means not only to let the people rule but also of 
teaching the people how to rule. This could mean that the existence of the jury 
increases the quality of government because large parts of the population have 
been involved in a “training course”. Hypothesis #7 could thus be: 
Countries that use trial by jury should experience a higher general quality of 
governance. 
Here again, economic variables are conjectured to be influenced: the quality of 
governance can be interpreted as an input into production and exchange; it should 
make production factors more productive and, hence, contribute to total factor 
productivity. If its quality is higher (or the cost of its provision lower) as a 
consequence of LP, this should be reflected in higher total factor productivity, 
c.p.. 
                                                 
12   Recent empirical evidence suggests that the amount of information that citizens acquire about their 
own political system is indeed endogenous to political institutions: Benz and Stutzer (2004) show 
that the amount of knowledge that citizens of various EU memberstates command about the EU 
institutions is determined by the absence/presence of referendums on European issues: citizens in 
states that have held referendums on European issues are significantly better informed than citizens 
of states that have not held referendums.   12
It is noteworthy to stress some of the differences between Blackstone’s and 
Tocqueville’s arguments. Whereas Blackstone – and many, probably most, others 
dealing with trial by jury – stresses the function of the jury as controlling state-
paid judges, Tocqueville sees (American) judges as sharing a certain desirable 
spirit, which would be adopted by large parts of the population. Economically 
speaking, it could be said that Tocqueville advances an argument in favor of a low 
degree of division of labor: he does not want to rely exclusively on professional 
judges but wants to include other parts of society which is an ideal within the 
notion of civil society: society itself is responsible for running the state, here the 
judiciary. Tocqueville argues that trial by jury seems to reduce the power of 
professional judges. But this would only be seemingly so: by being in contact with 
professional judges, jurors would learn of their spirit and even develop some awe 
for them. 
Almost one hundred years before Tocqueville, another Frenchman described some 
features not of the American but of the British political system. Montesquieu 
(1748) popularized the structure of the English political system on the continent. 
He famously described the judiciary as “en quelque façon nul”. Concerning the 
appointment of judicial competence, he argued (XI
th book, 6
th chapter) that it 
should be exercised by people that “are chosen according to law for specific times 
of the year from among the entire population. They ought to form a tribunal, 
which only exists as long as necessity demands.” Judicial competence should 
hence not be allocated to a tenured senate. This would reduce the amount of 
anxiety the population feels for the judiciary because juries are connected neither 
with a certain rank nor a certain profession.13 He continues to advance reasons in 
favor of trial by one’s peers. Spelt out as hypothesis #8, this conjecture can be 
formulated as: 
In countries with trial by jury, fear of the judiciary is substantially lower than in 
countries without trial by jury. 
Montesquieu evaluates his conjecture positively. Yet, it seems more difficult to 
evaluate the economic consequences of this conjecture: does the absence of fear 
induce people to take more cases to court? Would it, in other words, reduce the 
likelihood of settling disputes out of court? Could that not even be a negative 
effect because more resources will be spent on the courts? With regard to criminal 
                                                 
13   Modern economics has developed a remotely related concept: procedural utility. According to it, 
people can also derive utility from being subject to a fair process even when the final decision is 
against them (see Frey et al. 2004).   13
law, could absence of fear not entail the danger of more crimes? Or can “absence 
of fear” also be read as “trust in the governance of the court system”? If this 
interpretation turned out to be true, then people might be inclined to enter into 
more contracts in the first place which could, in turn, lead to better economic 
performance.14
In his Philosophy of Law, Hegel (1821) also advances a number of arguments in 
favor of trial by jury. He argues (§ 218) that in civil society (bürgerlicher 
Gesellschaft), a crime is not only an injury of something subjectively infinite 
(subjektiv-unendlich), but of a general concern (allgemeine Sache). It is the public 
at large that prosecutes criminals (§ 220), the penalty being more than simply 
revenge but “(s)ubjectively, it is the reconciliation of the criminal with himself, 
i.e. with the law known by him as his own and as valid for him and his protection; 
when this law is executed upon him, he himself finds in this process the 
satisfaction of justice and nothing save his own act.” 
According to Hegel, this would, however, be doomed to fail when the suspect is 
entirely dependent on professional judges because that would mean the exclusion 
of society from jurisdiction. He formulates his ideas concerning the jury in § 228: 
Owing to the character of the entire body of the laws, knowledge both 
of what is right and also of the course of legal proceedings may 
become, together with the capacity to prosecute an action at law, the 
property of a class which makes itself an exclusive clique by the use 
of a terminology like a foreign tongue to those whose rights are at 
issue. If this happens, the members of civil society … are kept 
strangers to the law, not only to those parts of it affecting their most 
personal and intimate affairs, but also to its substantive and rational 
basis, the right itself, and the result is that they become the wards, or 
even in a sense the bondsmen, of the legal profession. 
Hegel thus argues that the members of (civil) society ought to recognize that the 
administration of justice is part of their affairs. He refuses to accept the argument 
that professional judges could make decisions a lot more efficiently (ibid.): 
It may be the case that if the administration of justice were entirely in 
the hands of professional lawyers, and there were no lay institutions 
like juries, it would in theory be managed just as well, if not better. It 
may be so, but even if this possibility rises by general consent to 
probability, or even certainty, it still does not matter, for on the other 
side there is always the right of self-consciousness, insisting on its 
claims and dissatisfied if laymen play no part. 
                                                 
14   “Absence of fear” is hard to ascertain empirically, its consequences are even theoretically unclear. 
In the empirical section, we restrict our attention to the bivariate correlation between the use of lay 
participation and the number of reported crimes.   14
Unfortunately, it remains somewhat unclear what exactly Hegel has in mind when 
he writes of the better management of justice. At least two interpretations seem 
possible: It could mean that professional judges and lay juries come to basically 
identical decisions, yet professional judges need less resources for their decisions. 
Economists would then claim that the administration of justice by professionals is 
more efficient. This interpretation draws on a rather narrow interpretation of 
efficiency and Hegel would presumably quarrel with it. For him, the “self-
consciousness” is so important because he sees it as the only way to induce a 
society-wide discourse about right and wrong, which is a precondition for the 
general acceptance of the law. If the law is generally accepted in society, fewer 
people would violate it, fewer resources will have to be spent on the 
administration of the entire system and at the end of the day, self-consciousness 
increases efficiency, now more broadly delineated. Turned around, one could say 
that no legal system which is not generally accepted can ever be efficient. Hegel 
thus believes that the apparent trade-off between the efficiency of the 
administration of justice on the one hand and the self-consciousness on the other 
is only a superficial trade-off. Hegel seems to pronounce lexicographic 
preferences: first, the necessity of self-consciousness has to be satisfied. Only then 
will Hegel start to think about the management of the judicial system. 
But this is only the first of at least two possible interpretations. The second one 
would be that the better administration of justice through professional judges 
means that the likelihood that professional judges come to erroneous decisions is 
lower than that of lay juries. If that were what Hegel had in mind, his normative 
statement in favor of lexicographic preferences would be highly controversial: it 
could mean that he would accept a falsely declared death penalty for the sake of 
self-consciousness. Yet, this interpretation seems unlikely because it entails the 
danger of being self-contradictory: chances that a legal system will be generally 
accepted although the probability of wrongful conviction is high appear to be 
rather slim. Trying to focus on the more plausible interpretation of Hegel, we can 
now present hypothesis #9: 
Trial by jury induces a discourse concerning right and wrong onto society which, 
in turn, does not only improve the knowledge concerning the legal system but also 
increases the legitimacy of the entire political system. 
The close connection between this hypothesis and the one dealing with the higher 
degree of knowledge advanced by Tocqueville (hypothesis #7) is apparent. A high 
degree of legitimacy is supposed to have a number of economically relevant 
consequences: If a political system enjoys a high degree of legitimacy, it will   15
almost by necessity also be a stable system. Stability is, in turn, a precondition for 
high investment rates. A high degree of legitimacy is, hence, assumed to be 
strongly correlated with high investment levels. Another economically relevant 
consequence of a high degree of legitimacy is concerned with the size of the 
budget as well as its composition: a high degree of legitimacy is assumed to be 
correlated with lower degrees of tax resistance. This means that less resources 
need to be spent for monitoring the tax paying behavior of citizens. High degrees 
of legitimacy are, hence, expected to be correlated with smaller overall budget and 
a composition of the budget that allows higher degrees of productivity.15
To sum up: we have developed five hypotheses concerning the effects of LP on 
the judicial system, and four hypotheses concerning the effects on the political 
system. All of them contain the conjecture that LP improves either the judicial or 
the political system. Yet, some political philosophers have argued that the effects 
of LP on the judicial system could be negative. This implies the possibility of a 
trade-off. Whether it exists and what effect dominates is the subject of an 
empirical test. Before getting to the empirical test, the next section serves to 
present an overview of LP in the world today. 
3 An Overview over Lay Participation 
It is the purpose of this section to provide an overview of the various institutions 
currently used to make lay people participate in judicial decision-making. 
Unfortunately, no dataset containing the variables that we are interested in here 
was readily available. This is why we decided to construct a questionnaire which 
was sent to all the ministries of justice for which an address could be found. After 
some 2 months, a first round of reminders was sent out via e-mail. In addition to 
the ministries of justice, the questionnaire was also sent via e-mail to a number of 
other country experts such as judges, law professors, lawyers, but also activists 
from non-governmental organizations. For filling in the questionnaire, the country 
experts did not have to make personal evaluations of the situation in their country, 
but were asked to simply give information on the legal structure of the judiciary. 
                                                 
15   Whether this hypothesis holds true does, however, depend on other hypotheses being correct. 
Hypothesis number 1 claimed that the probability of wrong decisions would be lower in legal 
orders that rely on juries. If this hypothesis proves to be wrong, the effects of the jury on the 
legitimacy of a legal order are expected to be ambivalent: the participation of civil society as such 
could lead to an increase in the legitimacy of the judicial system, whereas the low quality of the 
decisions brought about by the jurors could reduce its legitimacy, the net-effect would then be 
subject to evaluation.   16
The questionnaire is, however, not the only source of information relied upon 
here. For some of the more general variables, readily available sources were used 
in addition to the questionnaire. Many questions were not answered by all 
respondents. The maximum number of countries covered by this survey is 80. The 
questionnaire is documented on our homepage. Note that the coding contained 
there was not contained in the version of the questionnaire sent to the country 
experts. 
Not all questions contained in the questionnaire are explicitly mentioned and 
described here. This is due to the fact that most questionnaires were filled in only 
partially. Questions for which the number of replies are insufficient to run 
regressions are generally not discussed here. 
In the introduction to the questionnaire, a lot of emphasis was put on the 
distinction between jurors on the one hand and lay assessors on the other. 
Nevertheless, the first question simply inquires whether the country knows any 
form of LP, thus including both types. 27 countries do not know any form of LP, 
whereas 53 countries covered do. Of the countries covered, 27 draw on juries, 
whereas 35 rely on lay assessors. 13 countries rely on both jurors and lay 
assessors (appendix 2 contains some more details). 
Usually, constitutions can only be changed by supermajorities. If the foundation 
for LP can be found in the constitution, this institution is entrenched – and should 
be more difficult to abolish than if it were not mentioned in the constitution. This 
variable allows us to test whether constitutionally entrenched juries (lay assessors) 
have more significant effects than juries (lay assessors) that are not entrenched. 
LP is explicitly mentioned in some 20 constitutions in one form or another. 
Trial by jury is often confined to specific cases. Historically, cases in which the 
government could have a special interest have often been delegated to juries such 
as cases involving freedom of the press. The most important question from an 
economic point of view is, however, whether participation of lay judges is 
confined to criminal cases or extends to civil cases as well: the number of private 
contracts, the ensuing degree of specialization etc. are unlikely to be heavily 
influenced by LP in criminal law cases, but might be influenced by LP in private 
law cases. Questions 4 and 28 contain information on the matter: The vast 
majority of legal systems is confined to criminal cases. Among the criminal cases, 
jurisdiction is usually confined to very serious crimes and the jurisdiction is 
determined either by the minimum sentence that would apply were a suspect 
declared guilty or by the court in front of which the case is tried (and these two 
criteria usually go hand in hand). There seems to be some difference between the   17
“other competences” of lay judges, depending on whether the legal system knows 
a jury system or draws on lay assessors: in the former case, issues of freedom of 
the press have, at least historically, played some role. In the latter case, labor 
disputes, but also social security issues and family law issues seem to have played 
a greater role.16
Question five deals with the percentage of all criminal /non-criminal cases that are 
dealt with by lay judges. The answers would thus allow us to assess the relevance 
of both kinds of LP quantitatively. It might well be that in some countries the 
institution of LP survived formally but is factually never or close to never used. 
Unfortunately, we only received information on these numbers from 21 countries 
which makes it almost impossible to use the data for an econometric analysis. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting that in Senegal, all criminal cases are dealt with by 
juries (for Finland it is 72%). Although the average is close to ten percent, the 
mode for this variable is 0 (including answers like “very close to zero”). The 
combination between juries and non-criminal cases is encountered most 
frequently in the Philippines where 25% of non-criminal cases are tried by juries. 
Here, the average is 1.5% with the mode still being 0. For lay assessors both 
modes (for criminal as well as for non-criminal cases) are also 0, yet the averages 
(for all they are worth) are higher, namely 22.83 and 15.65% respectively. In 
criminal cases, it is, again, Senegal that takes the lead with 100%, in non-criminal 
cases it is Vietnam (100%) and Turkey (70%). 
The questionnaire also deals with the historical use of LP. We believe this to be 
potentially important because a country that relied on LP for a century or so might 
still experience effects from that period today as LP might have shaped traditions 
on how judges behave vis-à-vis suspects or, more generally, how representatives 
of the state deal with citizens. The historical section provides information on two 
different aspects, namely whether the country under consideration relied more on 
juries or lay assessors (question 27) and whether LP was restricted to criminal law 
or also extended to private law (question 28). With regard to both criminal and 
private law, it asked when the competence was first created and when it was 
abolished, if applicable. 
In order to get a more complete impression of the various forms of LP and its 
diffusion around the world legal systems, we now describe a number of bivariate 
                                                 
16   A wonderful evaluation is due to Juliet Kaira Chibuta from the Southern African Legal Assistance 
Network, reporting on the situation in Zambia. She writes that the competence of lay assessors 
applies to those “matters of customary law that judges do not understand.”   18
correlations with historical, political, legal and sociological traits (table 1). The 
various forms of LP are represented as dummy variables. Countries in the first 
column are coded 1 if they currently have any kind of LP. Later on, a more 
specific question will be of interest, namely whether there are systematic 
differences between countries that rely on different forms of LP. The other 
columns contain dummy variables for these more specific forms. It will, of course, 
be of particular interest to compare the effects of trial by jury (column 2) with 
those of lay assessors (column 3). However, the general impression is that most 
correlations are not particularly high. 
It is often taken for granted that common law countries rely more heavily on juries 
whereas civil law countries tend to rely more on lay assessors. The signs of the 
respective coefficients in row 1 are in accordance with this assumption, yet they 
are far from being significant. The jury dummy even has the “wrong” sign when it 
is correlated with another dummy which is coded 1 for all countries that used to 
be British colonies.17 This changes when the forms of LP are correlated with the 
percent of the population speaking English (row 3): now, the correlation with 
juries is quite significant. 
The next row looks at possible correlations between LP and ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization. In highly fractionalized societies in which members of the 
various fractions do not trust each other, LP might be a problem. The result shows 
that the two are almost perfectly uncorrelated. This is also the case with regard to 
more specific measures focusing on one aspect of fractionalization (ethnicity, 
religion, language) alone (not reported in the table). 
Among institutional variables, the correlation between LP and presidential 
systems (row 5) is noteworthy: presidential systems are significantly less likely to 
have any kind of LP (with the exception of justices of the peace). 
The next group of variables (rows 6 through 10) does not focus on formal 
institutions, but rather on policy outcomes such as the level of realized political 
rights, civil liberties or democracy tout court. Two general observations stand out: 
first, LP is correlated with better performance in all dimensions, albeit often not 
                                                 
17   The correlation between countries that belong to the common law tradition and that also used to 
be British colonies is high, but not perfect. Countries that used to be British colonies but are not 
grouped as belonging to the common law family are Cambodia, Egypt, Jordan and Mauritius. 
Conversely, countries that belong to the common law tradition but that were not British colonies 
are Ireland, Namibia, Nepal, Thailand, the U.K. and the U.S..   19
very significantly. Second, the correlation of these indicators with juries is always 
higher than with lay assessors. 
Another dimension in which countries with lay assessors seem to be doing better 
than countries with trial by jury is the general level of trust. Many studies have 
shown that higher levels of trust are conducive to economic development because 
the costs of transacting are lower as many contracts need to be formalized or 
formalized to a lesser degree than in environments where people do not trust each 
other.18 Two more interesting results deal with the correlation between LP and the 
evinced interest in politics: people in countries relying on lay assessors are 
significantly less interested in politics than people in countries with trial by jury. 
Table 1: Bivariate Bravais-Pearson correlations 









1  Common  Law  (Dummy)  0.001  0.090 -0.090  0.008 0.216 
2  British Colonial History (Dummy)  -0.166  -0.055 -0.086 -0.140 0.071 
3  Eng  Frac*  0.207  0.382 -0.110  0.376 0.210 
4  Ethno-linguistic  fractionalization -0.001  -0.083 0.055  -0.030 0.158 
5  Presidential systems (=1; others = 
0) 
-0.338  -0.146 -0.327 0.169  -0.107 
6  Political Rights (1-7; 1= highest 
degree) 
-0.249  -0.313 -0.104 -0.041 -0.012 
7  Civil Liberties (1-7; 1= highest 
degree) 
-0.185  -0.280 -0.055   -0.012 
8  Freedom of the Press(0-100; 0= 
highest degree) 
-0.282  -0.344 -0.166 -0.078 -0.049 
9  De facto JI (0-1; 1 highest degree)  0.169  0.240  0.227  0.214  0.161 
10  Level of Democracy (Polity IV; -10 
– 10; -10 “perfect autocracy”) 
0.184  0.204 0.072 0.100 -0.013 
11  Confidence in the Legal System 
(sum of “complete” and “great 
deal” of confidence in%) 
-0.180  0.088 0.142 -0.057  -0.254 
12  Power Distance Indicator (0 to 
~100; higher values indicating 
higher power distance) 
-0.088  -0.263 -0.038 0.356  -0.154 
13  General level of trust (WVS)  -0.116  -0.373  -0.013  0.013  0.085 
14  Interest in politics (WVS)  -0.131  0.166  -0.413  0.157  0.055 
15  Follow Politics Closely (WVS)  -0.012  0.052  -0.449  0.284  0.189 
* Fraction of the population speaking English; 
The bivariate correlations are usually rather modest. Yet, they contain some clues 
about possible relationships. But in order to analyze them systematically, we need 
to move on to multivariate regression analysis which we do now. 
                                                 
18   But see Berggren et al. (forthcoming) who run a robustness analysis and find that after controlling 
for outliers, the trust-growth nexus is no longer robust.   20
4 Data and Estimation Approach 
After having developed a number of hypotheses (section two) and presented our 
dataset (section three), we now move on to describe our estimation approach. In 
order not to overburden the paper, we confine ourselves to testing four hypotheses 
explicitly, namely the influence of LP in judicial decision-making on (1) the 
factual independence of the judiciary, (2) the perceived degree of corruption in the 
judiciary, (3) government efficiency (proxied for not only by the variable 
“government efficiency” from the Governance Indicators provided by the World 
Bank but also by the Corruption Perceptions Index produced by Transparency 
International as well as the variable “Graft” – also from the World Bank), and (4) 
on labor as well as total factor productivity.19 The first two hypotheses thus refer 
to the effects of LP on the functioning of the judicial system, the last two 
hypotheses refer to very broad effects on the economy at large. 
All models can be described with the following equation:  
 Y i = α + βMi + γLPi + δZi + εi          (1) 
where Yi represents any of the outcome variables just mentioned in country i.   
is a vector of standard explanatory variables of country i; these differ depending 
on the dependent variable used. LP
i M
i is the measure of LP in country i,   is a 
vector of additional explanatory variables in country i that are introduced to check 
the robustness of the respective model under consideration and to consider the 
interaction with the institutional and socio-economic environment of a country, 
and 
i Z
i ε is an error term. 
For every hypothesis, 13 different variables proxying for LP are used. These 13 
variables can be divided into three groups, namely 
(1)  dummy variables for the current use of LP (all kinds of lay participation 
[LAYP], based on juries [JURY] or on lay assessors [LAYASS]), 
(2)  the anchoring of LP in the current constitution of a country (LAYPCON, 
JURYCON and LAYASSCON) and 
(3)  historical reliance on LP (LAYPHIS, JURYHIS, LAYASSHIS; HISCRIM 
(coded 1 if the competence of LP was restricted to criminal cases), HISCIV 
(coded 1 if it also extended to civil cases), TIMECRIM (number of years 
that competence with regard to criminal cases has been or was in place), 
                                                 
19   All variables are described in greater detail in the appendix.   21
WEIGHTIME (number of years if competence still exists; number of years 
divided by two if it has been abolished). 
The cross section analysis is performed by the simple OLS technique while 
inference is based on t-statistics computed on the basis of White heteroscedasticity 
consistent standard errors. Scholars of LP have often stressed that beneficial 
effects were to be expected only given that specific preconditions were met. Jeary 
(1960/1) mentions three conditions that need to be fulfilled if trial by jury is to 
function properly: (1) society must be racially, culturally, linguistically, and 
religiously homogeneous; (2) members of society must be sufficiently educated to 
understand their responsibilities as jurors; (3) members of juries must generally 
agree with the laws which they are supposed to enforce. Adding to this list, it 
seems plausible to assume that (4) very high degrees of inequality could inhibit 
the beneficial use of a jury, as some jurors might be motivated by aspirations of 
redistribution. 
Some of these preconditions can easily be controlled for by respective proxies. 
The homogeneity in terms of ethnicity and the like (condition 1) is taken into 
account by using an indicator which explicitly measures a mixture between ethnic, 
religious, and linguistic fractionalization. The degree of education (precondition 
2) is controlled for by the number of years that people spent in school. Whereas 
we do not know of any proxy for the third precondition, inequality in terms of 
income or wealth is controlled for by using the Gini-coefficient. We propose to 
work with interaction effects in ascertaining the relevance of the conditions for the 
beneficial functioning of LP empirically. 
5 Estimation Results 
The null-hypothesis that LP does not have significant effects on any of the four 
groups of dependent variables tested here cannot be rejected in many cases. We 
report primarily those estimates in which LP has at least some effect. 
First, we are interested to know whether LP has any effects on de facto Judicial 
Independence, the idea being that lay judges are more independent from 
government to begin with – and this would improve the overall level of factual 
independence of the judiciary from the other branches of government.20 As the M-
vector, we use the “democratic age” of a country (the older it is, the higher its de 
                                                 
20   Feld and Voigt (2006) show that a high level of de facto JI is significantly and robustly correlated 
with economic growth.   22
facto JI), the degree of checks and balances realized in 1995 (the higher its level, 
the higher the factually realized level of JI), and the degree of democracy (again, 
the higher the factually realized level of democracy, the higher the factually 
implemented level of JI). These three variables “explain” more than a third of the 
variation in the levels of de facto JI observed in 76 countries for which 
information is available (Adj. R
2: 0.3397). The estimates are displayed in table 
2.21 If this benchmark is augmented with any one of the three basic LP dummies, 
Table 2: Lay Participation and De Facto Judicial Independence 
Dependent Variable: 
De facto Judicial Independence   
Independent Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0.039  0.229*        LAYASSCON 
(0.47)  (2.44)       
    0.133* 0.119(*)  0.127(*) 0.142*  0.142* 
LAYPHIS 
    (2.14) (1.89) (1.83) (2.10) (2.15) 
-0.077  0.052  -0.147  -0.206  -0.141 
ELF 
(0.57)  (0.49)  (1.26)  (1.37)  (1.01) 
     -0.002    -0.003 
EDU 
     (1.32)    (1.64) 
  -0.618**       
ELF*LP 
  ( 3 . 5 9 )        
      -0.061  -0.021 
COMMONLO 
      (0.50)  (0.14) 
      0.023  0.024 
FRENCHLO 
      (0.30)  (0.29) 
      0.212*  0.202* 
GERMANLO 
      (2.67)  (2.46) 
      -0.011  -0.179  SOCIALO 
      (0.08)  (0.84) 
Constant  4.587 4.748 6.124 5.906 6.461 5.183 5.113 
               
Adjusted R²  0.415  0.479  0.398 0.518 0.442 0.421 0.504 
SER  0.186 0.175 0.193 0.173 0.178 0.190 0.168 
Jarque-Bera Value  2.143  2.113 0.833 0.855 0.540 4.924 4.223 
Observations  44 44 55 47 44 55 44 
(*), * and ** show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 10, 5, or 1 percent level, respectively. 
The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. SER is the standard error of the regression, and J.–B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the 
residuals. All regressions include AGE, CHECKS95, and POLIV as standard explanatory variables. “LP” indicates the lay 
participation variable that is interacted. 
                                                 
21   Note that the coefficients of the M-vector variables are not displayed in the table in order to save 
space.   23
they turn out insignificant. The constitutional LP dummies are only significant 
when interacted with the level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization or education. 
When LAYPCON is interacted with education, this variable is statistically 
significant. Economically, it is negligible: every 10 point increase in education 
would improve de facto JI by 0.08 (on a scale from 0 to 1). This result is not 
reported in the table in order to safe space. The interaction term between 
LAYASSCON and ethno-linguistic fractionalization is more significant, both 
statistically and substantially: Given that lay assessors are constitutionally 
entrenched, higher levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization are strongly 
correlated with lower levels of de facto JI. We interpret this as a confirmation of 
the conjecture that LP will have unwelcome effects if implemented in an 
environment characterized by a high level of fractionalization. 
Finally, history does seem to matter: countries that have ever had any form of LP 
(LAYPHIS) can expect to realize higher levels of de facto JI than countries that 
have not. This result is robust to the inclusion of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, 
education and legal origins. Note that German legal origin countries have 
significantly more independent judiciaries than the Scandinavian benchmark 
group. All other legal origins don’t show significant differences to the benchmark. 
We move on to the question whether LP is one determinant for differences in the 
reported level of corruption within the judiciary (results depicted in table 3). In 
our benchmark equation, we use three variables as the M-vector, namely (1) an 
indicator for procedural formalism (operationalized with regard to a hypothetical 
case, namely the eviction of a tenant, hence its name “eviction”; Djankov et al. 
2003). The conjecture is that higher levels of procedural formalism make the 
judiciary a more attractive target for corruption. (2) Per capita income (higher 
levels are conjectured to be correlated with lower levels of judicial corruption) 
and (3) a dummy for OECD-membership. In an estimation based on 71 countries, 
these three variables “explain” almost 70% of the variation in reported levels of 
corruption within the judiciary (adj. R
2: 0.6952). The dependent variable is coded 
from 1 (“common”) to 7 (“never occurs”). 
Trial by jury does not have any effect on judicial corruption (not reported in table 
3). As with regard to de facto judicial independence, a history of LP is one of the 
few LP variables showing up as significant. The result is robust to the inclusion of 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization, education and legal origins (column 2 through 
4). Regarding legal origins, both French and socialist countries suffer from 
significantly more corrupt judiciaries than the Scandinavian benchmark countries. 
Whereas LAYPHIS encompasses all forms of LP, TIMECRIM is restricted to the   24
number of years that LP with regard to criminal cases has been (or was) in place. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, TIMECRIM has a negative coefficient, implying a 
negative effect on judicial corruption. Although the coefficient needs to be 
multiplied by the number of years such competence has existed, the substantial 
effect seems rather limited: the effect of LAYPHIS would only be compensated 
after it has been in existence for some 180 years. Caution in the interpretation of 
these results is also in order due to the low number of observations. 
Table 3: Lay Participation and Corruption within Judiciary 
Dependent Variable: 
Judicial Corruption   
Independent Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0.508(*)  0.529(*)  0.673*       LAYPHIS 
(1.98)  (1.78)  (2.28)      
      -0.003(*) -0.003* -0.004(*) -0.026* 
TIMECRIM 
      (1.75) (2.30) (1.84) (2.20) 
 0.094  -0.426  -1.048  1.208  -1.852(*) 
ELF 
 (0.17)  (0.74)  (1.13)  (1.33)  (1.75) 
 0.014(*)  0.022*    0.008  0.024(*)  0.010 
EDU 
 (1.96)  (2.60)  (0.65)  (2.08)  (0.71) 
       0.000(*) 
EDU*LP 
       ( 1 . 9 4 )  
   0.062    -0.068  0.587 
COMMONLO 
   (0.13)    (0.13)  (0.66) 
   -0.737*     -0.589*  -0.648* 
FRENCHLO 
   (2.23)    (2.29)  (2.85) 
   -0.392    0.011  0.152 
GERMANLO 
   (1.23)    (0.03)  (0.37) 
   -0.779(*)     -1.196**  -1.150**  SOCIALO 
   (1.80)    (2.95)  (3.03) 
Constant  -1.370 -0.989 -1.360  -1.735 1.538 1.139 0.995 
               
Adjusted R²  0.738  0.765  0.788 0.740 0.779 0.810 0.835 
SER  0.648 0.617 0.586 0.593 0.547 0.508 0.473 
Jarque-Bera Value  2.428  1.737 1.924 1.792 1.119 0.456 0.236 
Observations  52 46 46 30 27 27 27 
(*), * and ** show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 10, 5, or 1 percent level, respectively. 
The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. SER is the standard error of the regression, and J.–B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the 
residuals. All regressions include EVICTION, LYP and OECD as standard explanatory variables. “LP” indicates the lay 
participation variable that is interacted. 
 
This concludes our analysis of the effects of LP on the judicial system. If LP has 
any effects, they seem to be rather weak. Among the weak effects, the one 
induced by the variable “LAYPHIS” seems to be strongest: it is significant as an   25
explanatory variable for both independent variables and seems to be rather robust. 
We now move on the question whether LP has any effects on broader variables. 
We begin by analyzing potential effects on governance indicators. None of the 13 
LP variables has a significant effect on either GRAFT or CPI. We hence constrain 
the discussion of the results to government effectiveness. The benchmark equation 
follows Persson and Tabellini (2003) and includes the average of political 
freedom and civil liberties, the “democratic age” of countries, their per capita  
Table 4: Lay Participation and Government Effectiveness 
Dependent Variable: 
Government Effectiveness   
Independent Variables 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
0.787  -1.569  -2.781(*)       
LAYP 
(1.66)  (1.52)  (1.83)       
    -2.553*       JURY 
    ( 2 . 6 2 )       
     0.670  -1.403    
LAYASS 
     (1.54)  (1.68)    
       -2.101(*)   
JURYCON 
       ( 1 . 9 4 )    
        -3.304** 
LAYASSCON 
        ( 3 . 4 0 )  
1.056 -0.475 -0.625 0.088 0.903 -0.457 -0.579 -1.23  ELF 
(0.96) (0.88) (1.07) (0.16) (0.98) (0.76) (0.81) (1.60) 
-0.015(*)  -0.025** -0.009 -0.029**  -0.016(*) -0.024* -0.019(*)  -0.017 
EDU 
(1.72) (2.83) (0.91) (3.51) (1.81) (2.63) (1.73) (1.50) 
   -0.088*       -0.030 
GINI 
   (2.33)       (1.11) 
-1.999(*)      -1.919(*)      ELF*LP 
(1.69)      (1.81)     
  0.021(*)   0.028*  0.018*  0.021(*)   
EDU*LP 
 (1.84)  (2.66)  (2.09)  (1.90)  
   0.080*       -0.076** 
   (2.10)       (3.47)  GINI*LP 
        
Constant 9.249  8.409  17.443  7.235 8.390 7.711 5.325 6.313 
                 
Adjusted  R²  0.844 0.840 0.838 0.835 0.829 0.823 0.822 0.830 
SER  0.800 0.810 0.819 0.856 0.845 0.858 0.893 0.857 
Jarque-Bera Value  2.771  7.013**  8.634  6.034*  1.970 7.062 8.081 2.218 
Observations  56 56 50 52 50 50 47 44 
(*), * and ** show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 10, 5, or 1 percent level, respectively. The 
numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
SER is the standard error of the regression, and J.–B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals. All regressions include 
GASTIL, AGE, LYP, LPOP, EDU, TRADE, OECD, FEDERAL, ELF, PROT80, CATH80, CONFU as standard explanatory variables. 
“LP” indicates the lay participation variable that is interacted.   26
income, the size of the population, education, the sum of exports plus imports as a 
share of GDP, OECD membership, whether a country is a federal state, the level 
of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, the percentage of protestants, of catholics and 
a dummy for societies dominated by Confucian traditions. The benchmark already 
explains more than 80 percent of the variation in reported levels of government 
effectiveness (the estimate includes 78 countries, the adj. R
2 is 0.8295). 
Concerning the augmentation of the benchmark equation with single variables, 
only HISJUR – i.e. having a history of trial by jury – shows up as significant. Yet, 
the number of observations is rather low. For what it is worth, the variable has the 
“wrong” sign (a history of trial by jury being correlated with lower levels of 
government effectiveness) and furthermore, the variable is not significant as soon 
as legal origins are controlled for (not documented in table). 
LAYP as such is not significant. The interaction effect of LAYP with ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, education, and the distribution of wealth does, 
however, show some statistical significance. The dependent variable is coded such 
that lower values stand for higher levels of effectiveness. The unconditional effect 
of ethno-linguistic fractionalization is as expected: higher values are correlated 
with higher values of government effectiveness, i.e. lower effectiveness. If ethno-
linguistic fractionalization is interacted with Lay Participation, a negative 
coefficient emerges which overcompensates the unconditional effect. Hence, 
given that any kind of lay participation exists, higher levels of ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization are correlated with higher levels of government effectiveness! 
The other two interaction effects (columns 2 and 3) are substantially negligible. 
Other cases where the substantial results are marginal at best are documented in 
columns 4, 6 and 7. The only other noteworthy results of table 4 are in columns 5 
and 8: If ethno-linguistic fractionalization is interacted with LAYASS, it leads to 
higher values of government effectiveness. In column 8, we observe another 
unexpected result: given that lay assessors are entrenched in the constitution 
(LAYASSCON), higher Gini-coefficients improve government effectiveness. 
We now move on to the fourth group of dependent variables, namely output per 
worker and total factor productivity. Drawing on Persson and Tabellini (2003) 
again, we use an identical M-vector for both dependent variables that consists of 
whether a state has a federal structure, the absolute latitude of the state, the 
fraction of the population speaking English as a native language, the fraction of 
the population speaking any of the major European languages, and the tradeshare 
predicted on the basis of a simple gravity model only taking into account the   27
country’s population and geographical factors. This benchmark model “explains” 
some 58% of the variation with regard to output per worker. 







1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
-0.674* -0.616** -0.583** -0.661**  -0.591* -0.558* -0.565*  -0.676** 
LAYASSCON 
(2.36)  (2.97) (3.18) (3.09) (2.08) (2.34) (2.33) (2.93) 
  -1.130 -0.898  -0.849(*)    -0.639 -0.694 -0.655  ELF 
  (2.24) (2.24) (1.99)    (1.51) (1.65) (1.66) 
   0.018**  0.017**     -0.004  -0.006 
EDU 
   (4.48)  (4.01)    (1.22)  (1.62) 
     -0.023*      -0.019* 
GINI 
     (2.08)      (2.28) 
Constant 7.253  7.945  6.763  7.907 7.271 7.663 7.942 8.895 
                 
Adjusted R²  0.657  0.703  0.771 0.799 0.531 0.561 0.559 0.663 
SER  0.575  0.535 0.470 0.448 0.436 0.422 0.423 0.382 
Jarque-Bera Value  2.237  1.682  8.868*  0.301 0.275 0.093 0.138 4.354 
Observations  47  47 47 43 47 47 47 43 
(*), * and ** show that the estimated parameter is significantly different from zero on the 10, 5, or 1 percent level, 
respectively. The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics based on White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. SER is the standard error of the regression, and J.–B. the value of the Jarque-
Bera-test on normality of the residuals. All regressions include FEDERAL, LAT01, ENGFRAC, EURFAC, FRANKROM 
as standard explanatory variables. 
 
If the benchmark model is augmented with one of the 13 LP variables at a time, 
none of the variables is robustly significant for explaining differences in output 
per worker. LAYASSCON (reported in columns 4 and 5 of table 5) and HISCIV 
are significant as long as no controls are added, but with a negative sign. 
HISCRIM has a positive sign, is robust to the inclusion of legal origins but there 
are only 25 observations for that variable. 
Results for total factor productivity are pretty similar. Augmenting the benchmark 
model with one LP variable at a time only leads to significant coefficients in two 
cases, namely with LAYASSCON and HISCRIM. HISCRIM has a positive effect 
on total factor productivity. The coefficient is remarkably robust, surviving the 
inclusion of legal origins as well as a dummy for membership in the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council. We refrain from including the results in table 6 
since there are only 25 observations. The other variable that reaches significance 
(LAYASSCON) is reported in columns 5 through 8 of table 5.   28
Throughout, an entrenchment of lay assessors in the constitution has a negative 
effect on both output per worker as well as on total factor productivity. In 
conclusion it seems fair to say that the effects of LP on governance indicators as 
well as on labor as well as on total factor productivity are modest at most. 
So far, our main focus has been on the question whether any kind of LP has 
systematic effects on the judiciary, the political system or economic variables. A 
different take of the issue would be to focus more on the differences between jury 
systems on the one hand and systems drawing on lay assessors on the other. At 
least some scholars would argue that the first would protect the individual from 
the state whereas the second was less likely to do so. If any kind of LP was 
positively correlated with judicial independence, it was rather lay assessors than 
juries (table 2). No significant differences could be identified with regard to LP 
and corruption within the judiciary (table 3). The picture changes, however, as 
soon as we turn to government effectiveness (table 4): here, jury systems display a 
significant effect on government effectiveness (on the 5% level), whereas lay 
assessors do not. Finally, table 5 shows that constitutionally entrenched lay 
assessors (“LAYASSCON”) have a negative effect on both output per worker and 
total factor productivity. If the same models are run with constitutionally 
entrenched juries (not in the table), this variable never reaches the 10% 
significance level. In other words: whereas lay assessors have a negative 
influence, juries do not. 
6 Conclusions and Outlook 
This is the first paper assessing the effects of lay participation in judicial decision-
making on a cross-country basis. It is based on a newly assembled data base 
comprising up to 80 countries. It is shown that, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
trial by jury and a common law legal tradition are not significantly correlated. 
Comparing systems relying on trial by jury with those relying on lay assessors, 
bivariate correlations indicate that countries relying on juries do better with regard 
to political freedom, civil liberty, freedom of the press and the realized level of 
democracy. Further, declared interest in politics is generally higher in these 
countries. On the other hand, people in countries relying on lay assessors display a 
higher level of general trust which has been shown to be of economic relevance as 
it facilitates economic exchange. 
Some legal philosophers have argued that the effects of lay participation should be 
more pronounced via a political, rather than a judicial, transmission mechanism. If 
anything, the results presented here show that the opposite might be closer to the   29
truth: lay participation has some positive effects on the judicial system (in terms 
of higher levels of de facto judicial independence and lower levels of corruption 
within the judiciary) but the effects on general governance indicators as well as on 
economic variables appear very uncertain. This implies, however, that a stylized 
economic argument pointing at the foregone benefits of a constrained division of 
labor is not corroborated either. 
In defense of the legal philosophers, one could add that today’s judicial systems 
are very different from the systems they were describing. On a more general note, 
it could be remarked that given the few cases dealt with by LP and the few 
citizens participating as lay persons, it would be presumptuous to expect 
significant effects on the macro level. Yet, their hypotheses were formulated on 
the macro level. Future studies might, of course, prefer to choose a more micro 
level. 
A more micro level might also be chosen if one is interested in highlighting the 
specific differences within jury or lay assessor systems. Not all of them are 
identical and some important ‘within-system variation’ might have gone 
unnoticed in this study. Case-studies might be one way of dealing with this kind 
of variation. 
Many of the hypotheses developed in section 2 of this paper have not been tested 
here in order to keep the paper reasonably short. It almost suggests itself to test 
the other hypotheses, too. Of course, there are many aspects not explicitly 
discussed here that would also deserve to be tested empirically. These include 
possible effects of jury size (e.g. on the perceived legitimacy of the judiciary as a 
whole), the modus of appointing lay judges and their socio-economic 
composition, the decision-rules used in lay participation, the likelihood of ever 
serving in a lay panel and so forth. 
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Thank you! 
The creation of the dataset on which this paper is based would have been impossible if 
the experts named here had not generously helped with their time and expertise. A 
heartfelt thanks to all of them again! 
Orlando Pulvirenti, Professor of Human Rights and Constitutional Law, School of Law, 
National University of Buenos Aires (UBA), (Argentina); Georg Stawa, judge assigned to 
the Ministry of Justice, Vienna (Austria); Professor Boudewyn Bouckart, CASLE, Ghent 
(Belgium); The Danish Ministry of Justice (Denmark); Solomon Areda, Judge at Federal 
High Court of Ethiopia (Ethiopia); Abg. César Vaca Sánchez, Coronel y Pérez, 
Abogados, Guayaquil (Ecuador); Age Värv, LL.M, Adviser, Courts Administration 
Division, Ministry of Justice of Estonia (Estonia);  Stéphane Cottin, Conseil 
constitutionnel (France); Mariam Hamidu, Assistant State Attorney, Ministry of Justic 
and Attorney General’s Department (Ghana); Organismo Judicial Licda. Lizett Najera 
Flores de Flores; Licda. Enma Graciela Salazar Castillo (Guatemala); Department of 
Justice, Equality and Law Refom; Bar Council of Ireland (Ireland); Oren Gazal-Ayal, 
University of Haifa, Faculty of Law (Israel); Giovanni Cordini, Full Professor of Public 
Comparative Law, University of Pavia (Italy); Badri and Salim El Meouchi Law Firm, 
Chadia El Meouchi, Jihad Rizkallah and Samia El Meouchi (Lebanon); Ministère de la 
Justice (Madagascar); Pacharo Kayira, Senior Assistant Chief State Advocate in the 
Ministry of Justice in the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (Malawi); Attorney 
General’s Office (Mauritius); Slaven Scepanovic, lawyer (Montenegro); Dr. Uju 
Agomoh, PRAWA (Nigeria); Dr. Khalil Ahmad (Pakistan); Carlos Ernesto González 
Ramírez (Panama); Centro Paraguayo para la Promoción de la Libertad Económica y de 
la Justicia Social (CEPPRO) (Paraguay); José Luis Sardón, Director Ejecutivo de la 
Sociedad de Economía y Derecho UPC (Peru); Stephen C. Thaman, Professor, Saint 
Louis University School of Law (Russia); Bernhard Seliger (South Korea); Prof. Dr. 
Juan-Luis Gómez Colomer and Dr. María-Angeles Pérez Cebadera, University Jaume I 
Castellón (Spain); Juliet Kaira Chibuta, Southern African Legal Assistance Network 
(Zambia).   31
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Appendix 1: Description and Descriptive Statistics of LAY PARTICIPATION variables 
Abbreviation Description  Number of 
observations 
Minimum Maximum Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
LAYP  Dummy coded 1 if state has 
any kind of lay participation 
80 0  1  0.663  0.479 
JURY  Dummy coded 1 if state has 
trial by jury 
72 0  1  0.375  0.488 
LAYASS  Dummy coded 1 if state has 
lay assessors 
73 0  1  0.493  0.503 
LAYPCON  Dummy coded 1 if any kind of 
lay participation mentioned in 
constitution 
69 0  1  0.275  0.450 
JURYCON  Dummy coded 1 trial by jury 
mentioned in constitution 
69 0  1  0.275  0.450 
LAYASSCON Dummy coded 1 if lay 
assessors mentioned in 
constitution 
71 0  1  0.155  0.364 
LAYPHIS  Dummy coded 1 if state has 
had any kind of lay 
participation in its history 
73 0  1  0.767  0.426 
HISJUR  Dummy coded 1 if state has 
had trial by jury at any time. 
27 0  1  0.667  0.480 
HISLAY  Dummy coded 1 if state has 
had lay assessors at any time 
37 0  1  0.730  0.450 
HISCRIM  Dummy coded 1 if 
competence was restricted to 
criminal cases 
36 0  1  0.500  0.507 
HISCIV  Dummy coded 1 if 
competence included civil 
cases 
35 0  1  0.829  0.382 
TIMECRIM  Number of years that lay 
participation has been used 
41 4  266  81.659  68.862 
WEIGHTIME  Number of years that lay 
participation has been used; if 
not currently in use; the 
number is divided by 2. 
41 2  266  74.061  73.053 
   33
Appendix 2: List of countries including some of their central codings 
Countries with JURIES 
 Country  Constitutionally 
entrenched? 
TIMECRIM WEIGHTIME  Legal  Origin 
1 Algeria  0  34  34  FR 
2 Australia  1  Na      COM 
3 Austria  1  152  152  GER 
4 Belgium  1  193  193  FR 
5 Brazil  1  178  178  FR 
6 Canada  1  199  199  COM 
7 Denmark  1  84  84  SCA 
8 Finland  0  266  266  SCA 
9 France  0  209  209  FR 
10 Ghana  1  40  40  COM 
11 Greece  1  166  166  FR 
12 Ireland  1  Na  Na  COM 
13 Madagascar    40  40  FR 
14 Malawi  0  Na  Na  COM 
15 Mauritius  0  Na  Na  FR 
16 Mexico  1  180  180  FR 
17 New  Zealand    Na  Na  COM 
18 Norway  0  113  113  SCA 
19 Panama  1  Na  Na  FR 
20  Russia  1 7 7  SOC 
21 Senegal  0  40  40  FR 
22 Spain  1  48  240  FR 
23 Sri  Lanka    Na  Na  COM 
24 Sweden  1  Na  Na  SCA 
25 Ukraine  1  Na  Na  SOC 
26 U.  K.  Na  Na  Na  COM 
27 United  States  1  Na  Na  COM 
 
Countries with LAY ASSESSORS 
 Country  Constitutionally 
entrenched? 
TIMECRIM WEIGHTIME  Legal  Origin 
1 Algeria  0  34  34  FR 
2 Australia  0  Na  Na  COM 
3 Austria  1  152  152  GER 
4 Belgium  0  193  193  FR 
5 Botswana  0  Na  Na  COM 
6 Bulgaria  0  48  48  SOC 
7 Burkina  Faso  0  32  32  FR 
8 Czech  Republic  1  32  16  SOC 
9 Denmark  1  84  84  SCA 
10 Estonia  0  Na  Na  SOC 
11 France  0  209  209  FR 
12 Germany    Na  Na  GER 
13 Ghana  1  40  40  COM 
14 Guatemala  0  8  8  FR 
15 Hungary  1  58  29  SOC 
16 Italy  0  141  141  FR 
17 Latvia  0  Na  Na  SOC 
18 Lebanon  0  Na  Na  FR   34
19 Madagascar    40  40  FR 
20 Malaysia  0  Na  Na  COM 
21 Mauritius  0  Na  Na  FR 
22 Norway  0  113  113  SCA 
23 Philippines  0  40  40  FR 
24 Poland    Na  Na  SOC 
25 Senegal  0  40  40  FR 
26 Slovakia  1  Na  Na  SOC 
27 Slovenia  1  106  106  SOC 
28 South  Africa    Na  Na  COM 
29 Swaziland  1  46  46  COM 
30 Sweden  0  Na  Na  SCA 
31 Switzerland  0  197  197  GER 
32 Turkey  0  Na  Na  FR 
33 Ukraine  1  Na  Na  SOC 
34 Venezuela,  rp  0  Na  Na  FR 
35 Vietnam  1  Na  Na  SOC 
 
















Countries without any lay participation (including justices of the peace and lay magistrates) 
 Country  Constitutionally 
entrenched? 
TIMECRIM WEIGHTIME  Legal  Origin 
1 Albania  0  46  23  SOC 
2 Argentina  0  Na    Na  FR 
3 Armenia  0  37  18.5  SOC 
4 Azerbaijan  0  Na  Na  SOC 
5 Bangladesh  0  na  Na  COM 
6 Cambodia  0  13  6.5  FR 
7 Chile  0  104  52  FR 
8 Costa  Rica  0  30  15  FR 
9 Cyprus  0  Na  Na  COM 
10 Ecuador  0  Na  Na  FR 
11  Egypt, Arab Rep. of  0  Na  Na  FR 
12 Iceland  0  na  Na  SCA 
13 India  0  Na  Na  COM 
14 Indonesia  0  Na  Na  FR 
15 Israel  0  Na  Na  COM 
16 Kazakhstan  0  Na  Na  SOC   35
17  Korea (South Korea)  0  Na  Na  GER 
18  Kyrgyz  Republic 0  40 20  SOC 
19 Lithuania  0  52  26  SOC 
20 Moldova  0  Na  Na  SOC 
21 Netherlands  0  Na  Na  FR 
22 Nigeria  0  Na  Na  COM 
23 Pakistan  0  102  102  COM 
24 Paraguay  0  70  35  FR 
25 Peru  0  Na  Na  FR 
26 Singapore  0  Na  Na  COM 
27 Uruguay  0  4  2  FR 
 
Appendix 3: List of Variables 
List of Variables (definitions and sources) 
AGE: 
Age of democracy defined as AGE = (2000 – DEM_AGE) / 200, with values varying between 0 und 1; source: Persson and 
Tabellini (2003). 
CATHO80: 
Percentage of a country’s population belonging to the Roman Catholic religion in 1980 (younger states are counted based 
on their average from 1990 to 1995); source: La Porta (1999) and  CIA (2005) for Lithuania, Nauru, Marshall Islands and 
San Marino. 
CHECKS95: 
Number of the factual vetoplayers in 1995; source: Beck et al. (2000) 
COL_UK: 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the country is a former U.K. colony, 0 otherwise, source: CIA (2005). 
COMMONLO: 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the country belongs to the common law legal origin, 0 otherwise; source: Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) and CIA. 
CONFILEG: 
Confidence in the Legal System: Sum of “complete confidence” and “a great deal of competence” according to ISSP 
survey 1998. 
CONFU: 
Dummy variable fort he religious tradition in a country, equal to 1 if the majority of the country’s population is 
Confucian/Buddhist/Zen, 0 otherwise; source: CIA (2000). 
CPI9804: 
Corruption Perception Index measuring perceptions of abuse of power by public officials. Average over 1998 – 2004. 
Index values between 0 and 10, lower values meaning lower levels of corruption (recoded from the original version); 
source: Transparency International and Internet Center for Corruption Research (http://www.icgg.org/). 
CRIME: 
Total recorded crime per 100 000 population; source: UN Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems, data for 1994  or closest year available. 
DE FACTO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
Average of up to 9 variables on a scale from 0 (dependent) to 1 (completely independent); source: Feld and Voigt (2006) 
EDU: 
Total enrollment in primary and secondary education as a percentage of the relevant age group in the country’s population; 
source: UNESCO (2006): Education statistics. 
ELF: 
Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, ranging from 0 (homogeneous) to 1 (strongly fractionalized) averaging five 
sources; source: La Porta (1999).   36
ENGFRAC: 
Fraction of a country’s population that speaks English as a native language; source: Hall & Jones (1999). 
EVICTION: 
Procedural formalism regarding a stylized case concerned with the eviction of a tenant; 0 = very simple and 100= highly 
complex; source: Djankov et al. 2003. 
EURFRAC: 
Fraction of a country’s population that speaks one of the major languages of Western Europe: English, French, German, 
Portuguese, or Spanisch; source: Hall & Jones (1999). 
FEDERAL: 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country has a federal political structure, 0 otherwise; source: Forum of Federations (2002): 
List of Federal Countries. 
FRANKROM: 
Natural log of tradeshare forecasted by Frankel and Romer’s gravity model of international trade which takes both a 
country’s population and its geographical location into account; source: Hall & Jones (1999). 
FRENCHLO: 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the country belongs to the French civil law legal origin, 0 otherweise; source: Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) and CIA. 
GASTIL: 
Average of indexes for civil liberties and political rights, each index is measured on a 1-to-7 scale with 1 representing the 
highest dgree of freedom. Countries whose averages are between 1 and 2.5 are called “free”, those between 3 and 5.5 
“partially free” and those between 5.5 and 7 as “not free”; source: Freedom House (2005). 
GERMANLO: 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the country belongs to the German civil law legal origin, 0 otherwise; source: Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) and CIA. 
GOVEF9604: 
Government effectiveness according to Kaufmann; average values for the years 1996, 1998 and 2000; source: Kaufmann, 
D., Worldbank (2005): Governance Indicators: 1996-2004. 
GRAFT: 
Graft according to the Governance Indicators of the World Bank focusing on perceptions of corruption. Values between 0 
and 10, where lower values signal higher effectiveness; source: Kaufmann et al. (1999). 
GRAFT9604: 
Graft according to the Governance Indicators of the World Bank; average values for 1996, 1998 and 2000; source: 
Kaufmann, D., Worldbank (2005): Governance Indicators: 1996-2004. 
JUDICIAL CORRUPTION: 
Irregular payments in judicial decisions from 1 (“very common”) to 7 (“never occurs”); source: World Economic Forum, 
Global Competitiveness Report 2004. 
LAT01: 
Rescaled variable for latitude, defined as the absolute value of LATITUDE divided by 90 and taking on values between 0 
and 1; source: CIA (2005). 
LEGAL ORIGINS: 
Dummy variables for COMMON LAW, FRENCH, GERMAN, SCANDINAVIAN and SOCIALIST legal origin; source: 
La Porta et al. 1998, CIA World Book of Facts. 
LOGA 2000: 
Natural logarithm of total factor productivity, own calculation for 2000 based on Hall & Jones (1999). 
LOGYL 2000: 
Natural logarithm of output per worker, own calculation for 2000 based on Hall & Jones (1999). 
LPOP: 
Natural logarithm of total population (in millions); sources: Penn World Tables, Center for International Comparisons at 
the University of Pennsylvania/ CICUP (2006) and CIA (2005).    37
LYP: 
Natural logarithm of real GDP per capita in constant dollars (chain index) expressed in international prices, base year 1985; 
average for the years 1990 – 1999; source: Column RGDPCH Penn World Tables, Center for International Comparisons at 
the University of Pennsylvania/ CICUP (2006). 
OECD: 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 for all countries that were members of the OECD; source: OECD (2006). 
PDI: 
Power Distance Indicator;  
POLCLOSE: 
Variable 217 of the 1999 wave of the World Values Survey indicating how closely the surveyed person was following 
politics; source: World Values Survey. 
POLINTEREST: 
Variable 133 of the 1999 wave of the World Values Survey indicating how interested the surveyed person was in politics, 
source: World Values Survey. 
POLIV: 
Factually realized level of democracy with -10 = “perfect” autocracy and 10 = perfect democracy; source: Polity IV Dataset 
PRES: 
Dummy variable for government forms, equal to 1 in presidential regimes, 0 otherwise. Only regimes in which the 
confidence of the assembly is not necessary for the executive to stay in power (even if an elected president is not chief 
executive, or if there is no elected president) are included among presidential regimes Most semipresidential and premier-
presidential systems are classified as parliamentary source: constitutions and electoral laws. 
PRESSFREE: 
Freedom of the Press from 0 = completely free to 100 = unfree, source: Freedom House 
PROT80: 
Percentage of the population in a country professing the Protestant religion in 1980 (younger states are counted based on 
their average from 1990 to 1995); source: La Porta (1999) and  CIA (2005) for Lithuania, Nauru, Marshall Islands und San 
Marino. 
SOCIALO: 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the country belongs to the Socialist law legal origin, 0 otherwise; source: Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) and CIA. 
TRADE: 
Sum of exports plus imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP; source: Worldbank (2005). 
 